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INTRODUCTION

Imagine being an eighteen-year-old girl, meeting a stranger twice,
and being told that you are to get married to him. Picture that the
dreams she had cultivated of care and companionship are shattered on
the very first night of the marriage when she is subjected to verbal and
sexual assault from the man that had vowed to love and protect her just
a few hours prior. Every night, she faces a new ordeal, from being
forced to mimic pornographic videos to forcibly having a candle or
flashlight inserted into her vagina. If she complains to her family, they
advise her to “try and adjust.” If she complains to the police, they
rebuke her and tell her to be grateful that her husband is coming home
to her instead of visiting a brothel. And when she tries to take her woes
to the Supreme Court, they tell her that she is bringing a personal claim,
not a public concern and as such, they cannot change the law for one
person. This is the unfortunate reality for countless Indian women
living among the culture of arranged marriages and remaining legally
unprotected from the realities of marital rape.1
This Note explores the gap in marital rape law in the Indian Penal
Code. Part I introduces the inception of the marital rape exception. Part
II discusses the background and evolution of rape law over the years in
India. Part III discusses arguments offered for and against the
criminalization of marital rape and offers evidence to undercut all
arguments proposed against criminalization. Part IV argues for
1. ‘Night After night, the torture grew’: A survivor of marital rape speaks up, DAILY
OPINION (May 12, 2016), https://www.dailyo.in/voices/women-marital-rape-sexualharassment-abuse-arranged-marriage-divorce/story/1/14390.html
[https://perma.cc/RTM8A9M8]; see Chhavi Sachdev, Rape Is A Crime In India – But There Are Exceptions, NPR (Apr.
13, 2016), https://www.npr.org/§s/goatsandsoda/2016/04/13/473966857/rape-is-a-crime-inindia-with-one-exception [https://perma.cc/6VSH-ANJR]; see also Vimi, Marital Rape – My
Husband Rapes Me Everyday!, PINKDOMBLOG (Aug. 1, 2017), http://pinkdomblog.com/
marital-rape/ [https://perma.cc/CZP2-HP9W].
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elimination of the marital rape exception, criminalization of marital
rape, and suggests that further actions such as gender-sensitivity
training for police personnel and the judiciary, establishment of crisis
centers, and implementation of measures to combat damaging
stereotypes need to be taken as well.
II. EVOLUTION OF RAPE LAW IN INDIA
A.

1983 Amendments

Since the inception of the Indian Penal Code (“the Code”) in 1860,
Sections 375 and 376 of the Code, which define the offense of rape
remained unchanged until the 1983 amendments. 2 Since then, the
progression of rape law in India has been an incremental, occasionally
gaining momentum in the wake of violent sexual crimes committed
against women and the ensuing public uproar. 3 The 1983 amendments
followed from protests that occurred as a result of the Indian Supreme
Court’s (“the Supreme Court”) ruling on the controversial Mathura
gang-rape case, Tukaram v. State of Maharashtra.4 In March 1972,
Mathura, a sixteen-year-old tribal girl, her boyfriend, Ashoka, and her
brother, Gama were taken to the local police station. 5 Mathura and
Ashoka were in a relationship and were planning on getting married.6
Mathura’s brother, Gama, had filed a kidnapping complaint against
Ashoka. 7 While in custody, Mathura was allegedly raped by multiple
inebriated male police officers. 8 In the controversial Supreme Court
ruling, the Court acquitted the officers reasoning that she “did not raise
an alarm, [there were] no visible marks or injury on her body,” and
since she had had prior sexual relations, she was of “loose morals” and
may have encouraged the officers to engage in intercourse with her.9
The case received public attention in 1979 when women’s rights groups
criticized both the mistreatment of rape victims in the Indian legal
2. Apoorva Ramaswamy, Anti-Rape Laws in India Prior to the Criminal Law Amendment
Act 2013 at 1.
3. See Renae Sullivan, Sexual Violence in India: The History of Indian Women’s
Resistance, 11 MCNAIR J. 71 (2015). See generally id.
4. Ramaswamy, supra note 2.
5. Sullivan, supra note 3, at 72; Ramaswamy, supra note 2, at 2-3.
6. Sullivan, supra note 3, at 72.
7. Sullivan, supra note 3, at 72.
8. Sullivan, supra note 3, at 72.
9. Sullivan, supra note 3, at 72 (internal quotation marks omitted); Ramaswamy, supra
note 2.
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system and the overall ignorance in Indian society about the
pervasiveness of rape. 10
The ensuing protests resulted in the 1983 Criminal Law
Amendment Act adding several important protections. 11 First off,
provisions were added recognizing rape in the context of abuse of
power by adding a category for custodial rape and recognizing specific
positions of power where abuse was widespread. 12 Explicit laws were
introduced penalizing abuse of power by public servants in their
official capacities, by superintendents or managers of jails, and by
hospital staff and management. 13 The 1983 Criminal Law Amendment
Act also shifted the burden of proof from the victim to the accused,
recognizing that the position of power allows for tampering of
evidence. 14 Furthermore, the amendments added a provision
criminalizing forced sexual intercourse by husband with his wife who
is living separately as a result of a legal judgment or due to custom.15
Two major pitfalls that the campaigners were not able to accomplish
through the 1983 amendments included the recognition of rape by
authority figures in the family setting and recognition of marital rape
outside the context of separation. 16 Nonetheless, as a result of the
rampant protests that followed the Mathura case, the 1983 amendments
began the wave of expansion and improvements of protections against
rape under the Indian Penal Code.
B.

2013 Amendments

The next wave of change came after the fatal Delhi gang-rape on
December 16, 2012. 17 A twenty-three-year-old female physiotherapy
intern returning home from a movie with a friend was beaten,
brutalized, and raped repeatedly on the bus by six men.18 She was
penetrated multiple times with a metal rod, which was pulled out of her
with such force that when she arrived at the hospital, only five percent

10.
11.
12.
13.
14.
15.
16.
17.
18.

Sullivan, supra note 3, at 72-73.
Ramaswamy, supra note 2, at 3.
Ramaswamy, supra note 2.
Ramaswamy, supra note 2.
Ramaswamy, supra note 2, at 4.
Ramaswamy, supra note 2, at 4.
Ramaswamy, supra note 2, at 5.
Ramaswamy, supra note 2, at 13.
Ramaswamy, supra note 2, at 13; Sullivan, supra note 3, at 74.
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of her intestines were left inside her.19 Less than two weeks later, Jyoti
Singh died at a hospital in Singapore. 20 Nationwide protests erupted as
a result of this crime and consequently, the former Chief Justice of
India, Late J.S. Verma established a committee to amend and enhance
laws against rape and sexual assault. 21 Among other recommendations,
the committee suggested that the marital rape exception should be
repealed as it originates from the notions of women being the property
of their husbands. 22
Several changes came about from the Criminal Law Amendment
Act, 2013. First off, with respect to Section 375, “rape” was given a
broader definition to include various forms of penetration on any of the
woman or girl’s body parts. 23 Prior to this amendment, the Indian Penal
19. Dominique Mosbergen, Delhi Bus Gang Rape Victim Has Intestines Removed As
Shocking Details of Assault Emerge, HUFFINGTON POST (Dec. 20, 2012),
https://www.huffingtonpost.com/2012/12/20/delhi-bus-gang-rape-victim-intestines-shockingdetails_n_2340721.html [https://perma.cc/7WKF-XDJB].
20. Rocky Soibam Singh, Dec 16 gang rape verdict: What happened the night Delhi was
shamed, HINDUSTAN TIMES (July 19, 2017), https://www.hindustantimes.com/delhi-news/dec16-gang-rape-verdict-what-happened-the-night-delhi-was-shamed/story9Y99n4OO3ZTdhXr2bPtzcL.html [https://perma.cc/PFV2-GJLC].
21. See Prachi Sharma et al., Sexual Violence in India: Addressing Gaps Between Policy
and Implementation, 30 HEALTH POL’Y & PLAN. 656, 656-57 (2015); see also Ramaswamy,
supra note 2, at 13; Himanshi Nagpal, The Historical Journey Of Rape Laws In India, FEMINISM
IN INDIA (June 22, 2017), https://feminisminindia.com/2017/06/22/historical-journey-rapelaws-india/ [https://perma.cc/8JGM-4ARD]; Amoolya, Comparison and critical analysis of the
rape laws before and after the Criminal Law Amendment (2013), ACADEMIKE (Feb. 3, 2015),
https://www.lawctopus.com/academike/comparison-critical-analysis-rape-laws-criminal-lawamendment-2013/ [https://perma.cc/9ZM2-EPAQ].
22. See Saptarshi Mandal, The Impossibility of Marital Rape - Contestations Around
Marriage, Sex, Violence and the Law in Contemporary India, 29 AUSTL. FEMINIST STUD. J. 255,
256 (2014); see also SHALU NIGAM, THE SOCIAL AND LEGAL PARADOX RELATING TO
MARITAL RAPE IN INDIA: ADDRESSING STRUCTURAL INEQUALITIES 1-2 (2015).
23. Amoolya, supra note 21; see Criminal Law (Amendment) Act, No. 13 of 2013, PEN.
CODE § 375:
A man is said to commit “rape” if he—
(a) Penetrates his penis, to any extent into the vagina, mouth, urethra or anus of a
woman or makes her to do so with him or any other person; or
(b) Inserts, to any extent, any object or a part of the body, not being the penis, into
the vagina, the urethra or anus of a woman or makes her to do so with him or any
other person; or
(c) Manipulates any part of the body of a woman so as to cause penetration into the
vagina, urethra, anus or any part of body of such woman or makes her to do so with
him or any other person; or
(d) Applies his mouth to the vagina, anus, urethra of a woman or makes her to do
so with him or any other person,
Under the circumstances falling under any of the following seven descriptions:—
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Code only accounted for vaginal penetration by a man’s penis as rape.24
A seventh “circumstance” was added for when a woman is unable to
communicate consent. 25 This amendment also clarified and solidified
the provision that lack of physical resistance does not amount to
consent. 26 Under Section 376, several specific acts of rape were added
including rape by the armed forces, by a relative, guardian, teacher,
person in position of trust or authority, on a person incapable of giving
consent, by a person in a position of control or dominance, on a person
suffering from mental or physical disability, rape which causes
grievous harm or disfiguring or maiming or endangering the life of the
person, and persistent rape committed against the same woman. 27 It
further criminalized other forms of violence against women such as
acid attacks, stalking, and voyeurism. 28 The shortcomings of this
amendment include changing the age of consent from sixteen to
eighteen, retaining the violation of “outraging the modesty of a
First.—Against her will.
Secondly.—Without her consent.
Thirdly.—With her consent, when her consent has been obtained by putting her or
any person in whom she is interested, in fear of death or of hurt.
Fourthly.—With her consent, when the man knows that he is not her husband and that
her consent is given because she believes that he is another man to whom she is or
believes herself to be lawfully married.
Fifthly.—With her consent when, at the time of giving such consent, by reason of
unsoundness of mind or intoxication or the administration by him personally or
through another of any stupefying or unwholesome substance, she is unable to
understand the nature and consequences of that to which she gives consent.
Sixthly.—With or without her consent, when she is under eighteen years of age.
Seventhly.—When she is unable to communicate consent.
Explanation 2.—Consent means an unequivocal voluntary agreement when the
woman by words, gestures or any form of verbal or non-verbal communication,
communicates willingness to participate in the specific sexual act:
Provided that a woman who does not physically resist to the act of penetration shall
not by the reason only of that fact, be regarded as consenting to the sexual activity.
Exception 2.—Sexual intercourse or sexual acts by a man with his own wife, the wife
not being under fifteen years of age, is not rape.
See also, Mandal, supra note 22, at 257-58.
24. See Amoolya, supra note 21. See also Ramaswamy, supra note 2, at 14.
25. Amoolya, supra note 21; Ramaswamy, supra note 2.
26. Amoolya, supra note 21; Ramaswamy, supra note 2.
27. See Criminal Law (Amendment) Act, No. 13 of 2013, PEN. CODE § 376(c), (f), (j), (k),
(l), (m), (n).
28. Press Release, Amnesty Int’l, India: New Sexual Violence Law Has Both Positive and
Regressive Provisions (Mar. 22, 2013), available at https://www.amnesty.org/en/pressreleases/2013/03/india-new-sexual-violence-law-has-both-positive-and-regressive-provisions2/ [https://perma.cc/DX6S-JUGC] [hereinafter India: New Sexual Violence Law].

2019]

THE GAP IN MARITAL RAPE LAW IN INDIA

1525

woman,” introducing of the death penalty for sexual assaults that result
in death or a vegetative state for the victim, and retaining immunity for
rape committed by security forces. 29 Many changes made under The
Criminal Law Amendment Act, 2013 were necessary and substantive,
but the Act failed to criminalize marital rape with the exception of
Section 376A where sexual intercourse by a man with his wife who is
living separately shall be punishable with imprisonment and liable for
a fine and where the girl is under the age of fifteen. 30
C. Independent Thought v. Union of India
The most recent change came through the Supreme Court’s
decision under Independent Thought vs. Union of India in October
2017. 31 The case was filed as a Public Interest Litigation by the nongovernmental organization, Independent Thought, to protect child
brides from marital rape. 32 Exception 2 under Section 375 of the Indian
Penal Code provides an exemption to rape for men having sexual
intercourse with their wives under the age of fifteen. 33 In Independent
Thought, Supreme Court Justices Madan B. Lokur and Deepak Gupta
rationalized that Indian Penal Code, Section 375, Exception 2 should
not apply to child brides between the ages of fifteen and seventeen.34
The Court held that Exception 2 creates an arbitrary and discriminatory

29. Id.
30. Criminal Law (Amendment) Act, No. 13 of 2013, PEN. CODE § 375, Exception 2;
India: Reject New Sexual Violence Ordinance, HUM. RTS. WATCH (Feb. 11, 2009, 9:30 PM),
https://www.hrw.org/news/2013/02/11/india-reject-new-sexual-violence-ordinance
[https://perma.cc/G887-JE6B]; see India: New Sexual Violence Law, supra note 28; see also,
The Criminal Law (Amendment) Act, No. 13 of 2013, PEN. CODE § 376A:
Whoever has sexual intercourse with his own wife, who is living separately, whether
under a decree of separation or otherwise, without her consent, shall be punished with
imprisonment of either description for a term which shall not be less than two years
but which may extend to seven years, and shall also be liable to fine.
Explanation.—In this section, “sexual intercourse” shall mean any of the acts
mentioned in clauses (a) to (d) of § 375.
31. Independent Thought v. Union of India, (2017) 382 SCC (India).
32. Urmila Pullat, The Legal Dissonance Between Marriage and Rape in India, THE WIRE
(Oct. 14, 2017) https://thewire.in/gender/the-legal-dissonance-between-marriage-and-rape-inindia [https://perma.cc/D9X6-WXY5]. Public Interest Litigation in India loosens the standing
requirement and allows any private party to bring a claim for the protection of public interest.
33. PEN. CODE (1860), § 375, Exception 2.
34. Independent Thought, 382 SCC; see Pullat, supra note 31.
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distinction between a married girl child and an unmarried girl child.35
The Supreme Court offered well-supported and rational arguments to
defend its decision to change the exception from “under fifteen years
of age” to “under eighteen years of age.” 36
The Court stipulated that the distinction between the married girl
child and the unmarried girl child is contrary to the spirit of the
Constitution of India (“the Constitution”), specifically Article 15(3)
and Article 21. 37 The concurring judgment also pointed out equal
protection clause under Article 14 of the Constitution. 38 Similarly, the
Court identifies that the Constitution and the Protection of Human
Rights Act, 1993, guarantee liberty and dignity as protected rights and
to allow a man to engage in forced sexual intercourse with his child
bride would be a violation of these rights. 39 The Supreme Court also
recognized the importance of a woman’s autonomy over her own body,
her right to bodily integrity, and her right to privacy. 40
Furthermore, the Court pointed out the inconsistencies that arise
from the fact that husbands can be charged with lesser sexual crimes,
while enjoying an exemption from the much more serious crime of
rape. 41 Lesser crimes for which the husband can be prosecuted include
intent to outrage her modesty, sexual harassment, assault or use of
criminal force against woman with the intent to disrobe, voyeurism,
and stalking. 42 There are no marital exception clauses associated with
any of these crimes. 43 Relatedly, women also enjoy protection under
35. Independent Thought, 382 SCC. Child marital rape is now illegal.
36. Independent Thought, 382 SCC.
37. Independent Thought, 382 SCC at 2, 4; Independent Thought, 382 SCC at 112, 114
(Deepak Gupta, J., concurring); see also INDIA CONST., art. 15(3) (“Nothing in this article shall
prevent the State from making any special provision for women and children.”); INDIA CONST.,
art. 21 (“No person shall be deprived of his life or personal liberty except according to procedure
established by law.”).
38. Independent Thought, 382 SCC at 112 (Deepak Gupta, J. concurring); see also INDIA
CONST., art. 14 (“The State shall not deny to any person equality before the law or the equal
protection of the laws within the territory of India.”).
39. Independent Thought, 382 SCC at 22, 38-39 (quoting Maharashtra v. Madhukar
Narayan Mardikar, (1990) 26 SCR 115-17).
40. Independent Thought, 382 SCC at 14-15, 38 (quoting Maharashtra v. Madhukar
Narayan Mardikar, (1990) 26 SCR 115-17); Independent Thought, 382 SCC at 41 (quoting State
of Karnataka v. Krishnappa, (2000) 2 SCR 761); Independent Thought, 382 SCC at 125-26
(urging the right of privacy from Justice K.S. Puttaswamy (Retd.) & Anr. v. Union of India,
(2018) 494 SCC (India).
41. Independent Thought, 382 SCC at 21.
42. Independent Thought, 382 SCC at 21; Independent Thought, 382 SCC at 120-21
(Deepak Gupta, J., concurring).
43. Independent Thought, 382 SCC at 121 (Deepak Gupta, J., concurring).
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Section 3 of the Protection of Women from Domestic Violence Act,
2005. 44 Lastly, the Court pointed to India’s international obligations,
especially under the Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of
Discrimination Against Women (“CEDAW”). 45 The decision under
Independent Thought v. Union of India was a milestone for advocates
in furthering the fight against marital rape.
III. PERSPECTIVES ON CRIMINALIZATION OF MARITAL RAPE
A.

Arguments against Criminalization of Marital Rape

There are several arguments put forth by supporters of the marital
rape exception that have been countered by national and international
studies, court of law decisions, and various academics. First off,
advocates purport that women already have adequate legal remedies
through the Protection of Women from Violence Act as well as Section
498A of the Indian Penal Code. Further, the reasoning used by India’s
Law Commission as well as other high-positioned officials is one of
cultural relativism indicating that criminalizing marital rape is not
feasible in the context of the Indian culture. Among these arguments,
proponents also maintain that marriage connotes consent, that marital
rape is uncommon in India, and that providing a specific legal recourse
for marital rape in the criminal code would be misused by women.
Overall, these arguments are augmented by ingrained stereotypes and
stigma against women that is prevalent in Indian society and can be
reasonably opposed by current statistics and academic findings.
1. Adequate Legal Recourse Against Marital Rape Already Exists
Many proponents of maintaining the marital rape exception state
that the gap created by the exception has been filled by the Protection
of Women from Domestic Violence Act of 2005, Section 498A of the
Indian Penal Code, and the Hindu Marriage Act.46 The Domestic
44. Independent Thought, 382 SCC at 22. (Section 3 provides protection from conduct
that harms, injures, or endangers the health, safety, life, limb, or well-being of a woman, whether
that amounts to mental, physical, sexual, or economic abuse).
45. Independent Thought, 382 SCC at 25-26. India signed on to the CEDAW Convention
on July 30, 1980 and ratified it on July 9, 1993.
46. Rea Savla, Trapped in Tradition’s Prison: Why India is Not Ready to Criminalize
Marital Rape, BERKELEY POL. REV. (Oct. 29, 2019), https://bpr.berkeley.edu/2015/10/29/
trapped-in-traditions-prison/ [https://perma.cc/7QHM-LGH2]; see S. Murlidharan, Law on
Marital Rape: Why the Domestic Violence Act is a Reasonable Substitute, FIRSTPOST (May 3,
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Violence Act recognizes sexual abuse within the definition of domestic
violence and provides civil remedies including protection orders,
judicial separation, and monetary compensation. 47 Section 498A of the
Penal Code provides criminal penalties for a husband or his relatives
subjecting a woman to cruelty. 48 Furthermore, Section 13 of the Hindu
Marriage Act allows “cruelty” to be used as a grounds for divorce. 49
An immediate setback of the Domestic Violence Act is seen in the
fact that this act only provides civil remedies, but does not classify
marital rape as a criminal offense. 50 Furthermore, Section 122 of the
Indian Evidence Act prohibits disclosure of communications during
marriage in court unless one spouse is being prosecuted for a crime
against the other spouse. 51 As such, since the Domestic Violence Act
only provides civil remedies for sexual violence perpetrated against
wives, spousal communication may be relevant to attaining appropriate
remedies and yet, would be inadmissible. 52 Furthermore, the Hindu
2015), https://www.firstpost.com/living/law-marital-rape-domestic-violence-act-reasonablesubstitute-2223674.html [https://perma.cc/2A4C-SJYZ]; Mandal, supra note 22, at 263; see also
NIGAM, supra note 22, at 2.
47. The Protection of Women from Domestic Violence Act, No. 43 of 2005, PEN. CODE;
see Sakshi Kanodia & Ranjabati Ray, Why Penalize Marital Rape, 21 J. OF HUMAN. & SOC. SCI.
49, 53 (2016); Savla, supra note 46; see also Murlidharan, supra note 46.
48. PEN. CODE § 498A (India).
Husband or relative of husband of a woman subjecting her to cruelty—
Whoever, being the husband or the relative of the husband of a woman, subjects such
woman to cruelty shall be punished with imprisonment for a term which may extend
to three years and shall also be liable to fine.
Explanation—For the purpose of this §, “cruelty” means—
a. any willful conduct which is of such a nature as is likely to drive to woman
to commit suicide or to cause grave injury or danger to life, limb or health
(whether mental or physical) of the woman; or
b. harassment of the woman where such harassment is with a view to coercing
her or any person related to her to meet any unlawful demand for any property
or valuable security or is on account of failure by her or any person related to
her to meet such demand.
49. Hindu Marriage Act, No. 25 of 1955, HINDU CODE, § 13; Dr. Sanjay Sindhu & Monika
Thakur, Indian Perspective on the Legal Status of Marital Rape: An Overview, 2 INT’L J. OF
MULTIDISCIPLINARY APPROACH & STUD. 235, 239 (2015).
50. Kanodia & Ray, supra note 47, at 53. See also NIGAM, supra note 22, at 2.
51. Indian Evidence Act, No. 1 of 1872, INDIA CODE (1993), § 122; Akansha Singh,
Marital Rape: A Socially and Legally Justified Crime in India, in SECOND INTERNATIONAL
CONFERENCE OF THE SOUTH ASIAN SOCIETY OF CRIMINOLOGY AND
VICTIMOLOGY 26 (K. Jaishankar & Natti Ronel eds., 2013).
52. Indian Evidence Act; Singh, supra note 51.

2019]

THE GAP IN MARITAL RAPE LAW IN INDIA

1529

Marriage Act and the Domestic Violence Act give women a recourse
to remove themselves from a violent and dangerous situation, but
neither does anything to deter the violent behavior itself. Simply
granting a divorce on the basis of cruelty still provides the perpetrator
with the freedom to marry another woman and subject her to the same
abuse. 53 Lastly, in upholding a Madras High Court decision, the
Supreme Court in India stated that denial of conjugal relations in a
marriage can amount to “cruelty” and be grounds for seeking a
divorce. 54 As such, instead of arguing that women can be subjected to
the torture of marital rape and then seek divorce on the basis of cruelty,
it would stand to reason for the government to criminalize marital rape
and retain the allowance for men to seek a divorce on the grounds that
denial of sexual relations is cruel.
2. Cultural Relativism
At the forefront of the fight against criminalization is the
argument that the concept of marital rape cannot work in India due to
the stark cultural differences between the prevalent culture in India and
the concept of marriage in the West. 55 The argument put forth is that
social customs and values, religious beliefs, and the idea of marriage
as a sacrament along with the staggering rate of poverty, illiteracy, and
lack of education, all create an environment in India that is not
conducive for the criminalization of marital rape. 56 Proponents of this
argument stipulate that criminalizing marital rape is intruding on the
privacy of the sacrament of marriage. 57 A few facets emerge from the
cultural relativism argument. First off, the cultural value placed on the
sanctity of marriage advances the argument that criminalizing marital
rape would destroy the institution of marriage. 58 This argument has
53. NIGAM, supra note 22, at 4.
54. Manish Raj, Denial of sex by spouse is cruelty: Supreme Court, THE TIMES OF INDIA
(Sept. 26, 2014), https://timesofindia.indiatimes.com/india/Denial-of-sex-by-spouse-is-crueltySupreme-Court/articleshow/43470243.cms [https://perma.cc/6XMM-88T3].
55. Mandal, supra note 22, at 257.
56. Sachdev, supra note 1. Sonal Singh, Dear Supreme Court, Here’s Why Marital Rape
Should be Criminalised, THE BETTER INDIA (Dec. 1, 2017), https://www.thebetterindia.com/
123017/supreme-court-criminalise-marital-rape-laws-india/ [https://perma.cc/WA5W-TER8].
Press Release, Gov’t of India Ministry of Home Affairs, Women Subjected to Marital Rape
(Apr. 29, 2015); NIGAM, supra note 22, at 2.
57. See Sindhu & Thakur, supra note 49, at 244.
58. Independent Thought, 382 SCC at 57; Singh, supra note 51; Samarjit Pattnaik, et al.,
The Viewpoint: The law on Criminalisation of Marital Rape, BAR & BENCH (Dec. 27, 2017),
https://barandbench.com/viewpoint-criminalisation-marital-rape/
[https://perma.cc/4BPC-

1530 FORDHAM INTERNATIONAL LAW JOURNAL

[Vol. 42:5

already been struck down by the Supreme Court in Independent
Thought, where the Court specifically explained that marriage is
personal and nothing short of the Indian State (“the State”)
criminalizing marriage itself can destroy the institution of marriage.59
The Court further elaborated that if divorce and judicial separation are
not seen as destroying the institution of marriage, the concept of marital
rape certainly does not have the potential of destroying the institution
of marriage. 60 Moreover, the High Court of Gujarat, India has recently
argued that the non-consensual act of marital rape violates the trust and
confidence within a marriage and the prevalence of marital rape in
India is what has damaged the institution of marriage. 61 Secondly, the
culture of India is cited to say that most Indian women are not
financially independent or literate and thus would be unable to survive
outside the framework of marriage. 62 The State is obligated under the
Constitution as well as its international obligations to provide
institutions where women can access needed assistance in order to be
able to survive outside of the context of marriage.
3. Implied Consent
A common argument used against the criminalization of marital
rape is the idea of implied consent within a marriage. In 1736, Sir
Matthew Hale of England had declared that “the husband cannot be
guilty of rape committed by himself upon his lawful wife, for by their
mutual matrimonial consent and contract the wife hath given herself up
in this kind unto her husband which she cannot retract.” 63 Another
historical justification for not recognizing marital rape comes from
William Blackstone in 1753 when he defended the common law
doctrine of coverture. 64 Blackstone contended that
V44K]. See generally LAW COMMISSION OF INDIA, 172ND REPORT ON REVIEW OF RAPE LAWS
(2000).
59. Independent Thought, 382 SCC at 57.
60. Independent Thought, 382 SCC at 57.
61. Nimeshbhai Bharatbhai Desai v. State of Gujarat, (2017) No. 26957, at 1-2 (India).
Pattnaik et al., supra note 58.
62. Swarupa Dutt, Why marital rape should be criminalised, REDIFF NEWS (Sept. 12,
2017),
http://www.rediff.com/news/interview/why-marital-rape-should-be-criminalised/
20170912.htm [https://perma.cc/2VZS-XAZR].
63. SIR MATTHEW HALE, THE HISTORY OF THE PLEAS OF THE CROWN 628 (1736);
Independent Thought, 382 SCC at 44-45.
64. SIR WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, 1 COMMENTARIES ON THE LAWS OF ENGLAND IN FOUR
BOOKS, *442 (1893) (emphasis in original); Maria Pracher, The Marital Rape Exemption: A
Violation of a Woman’s Right of Privacy, 11 GOLDEN GATE U. L. REV. 717, 727 (1981).
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[B]y marriage, the husband and wife are one person in law: that is,
the very being or legal existence of the woman is suspended during
the marriage, or at least incorporated and consolidated into that of
the husband: under whose wing, protection, and cover, she
performs every thing [sic] . . . and her condition during her
marriage is called her coverture. 65

This immunity was revoked in England and Wales in 1991, when Lord
Keith communicated on behalf of the Court that modern marriage is a
partnership of equals and the wife is no longer considered the
subservient chattel of the husband. 66 The revocation was further
supported by the European Commission of Human Rights, which
attested that the rapists’ relationship with the victim does not change
the fact that he is a rapist. 67 Nonetheless, the argument that marriage
implies consent is still used today in India to justify the marital rape
exemption in the penal code as seen by the Law Commission of India’s
172nd Report on Review of Rape Laws of 2000. 68
4. Marital Rape is Uncommon
Another argument put forth by advocates for maintaining the
marital rape exception is that cases of rape within the marital context
are few. 69 In a survey done by the United Nations Populations Fund in
2000, one-third of Indian men admitted to perpetrating some form of
sexual violence against their wives. 70 Another study done in 2011 by
the International Center for Research on Women indicated that one in
five Indian men admitted to having forced sexual relations with their
wives. 71 Furthermore, the Committee on the Elimination of
Discrimination against Women in its 2014 concluding observations
noted concern about the 902.1% increase of violent crimes against
women including cases of rape as compiled by the National Crime
65. BLACKSTONE, supra note 64, at *442; Pracher, supra note 64, at 727.
66. Independent Thought, 382 SCC at 45.
67. Id.
68. LAW COMMISSION OF INDIA, 172ND REPORT ON REVIEW OF RAPE LAWS (2000);
NIGAM, supra note 22, at 13.
69. See Sindhu & Thakur, supra note 49, at 244.
70. NANDA PRIYA ET AL., MASCULINITY, INTIMATE PARTNER VIOLENCE AND SON
PREFERENCE IN INDIA – A STUDY 38-39 (2014).
71. Flavia Agnes, § 498A, Marital Rape and Adverse Propaganda, ECON. & POL. WKLY.
(June 6, 2015), http://www.epw.in/system/files/pdf/2015_50/23/§_498A_Marital_Rape_and_
Adverse_Propaganda.pdf [https://perma.cc/KA2N-ZJRT]; NIGAM, supra note 22, at 10.
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Records Bureau. 72 Furthermore, a National Family Heath Survey
conducted in all twenty-nine states by the Ministry of Health and
Family Welfare in India in 2005 and 2006 surveyed over 125,000
women and found that two-fifths of all married women have
experienced physical, sexual, or emotional abuse perpetrated by
partners. 73 Specifically, one out of every ten married women disclose
that they have faced sexual violence, either by being physically forced
to have intercourse or being forced into performing unwanted sexual
acts. 74
5. Repealing the Marital Rape Exception Will Lead to Misuse by
Wives
Lastly, defenders of the marital rape exception purport that
repealing the exception will allow wives to misuse the law and bring
rape charges against their husbands to settle scores in unrelated
quarrels. 75 This argument has been used time and time again for various
domestic violence laws enacted to protect women in India including
the Protection of Women from Domestic Violence Act, the Dowry
Prohibition Act and Section 498A of the Indian Penal Code, which
criminalizes physical and mental cruelty against a woman by her
husband or his family. 76 For example, in Arnesh Kumar v. State of
Bihar, the Supreme Court stipulated that Section 498A is being used as
a weapon by disgruntled wives rather than a shield. 77 Supporters of this
argument have consistently failed to provide empirical evidence in
defense of their claims. 78
The argument that women misuse laws enacted for their
protection stems from the statistics that only about fifteen percent of
dowry-related cases under the Dowry Prohibition Act and about
fourteenth percent of cases under Indian Penal Code Section 498A
72. Committee on the Elimination of Discrimination Against Women, Concluding
observations on the combined fourth and fifth periodic reports of India, §
10(a), CEDAW/C/IND/CO/4-5 (July 18, 2014) [hereinafter Concluding Observations].
73. Ministry of Health and Family Welfare Government of India, National Family Health
Survey, NFHS-3 at 95-96 (2005-06); NIGAM, supra note 22, at 10.
74. National Family Health Survey, supra note 73, at 98.
75. Mandal, supra note 22, at 257; see NIGAM, supra note 22, at 1.
76. Mandal, supra note 22, at 262; see NIGAM, supra note 22, at 1; Rajesh Sharma & Ors.
v. State of UP and Anr., (2017) 1265 SCC (India).
77. Arnesh Kumar v. State of Bihar, (2014) 9127 SCC (India); NIGAM, supra note 22, at
15.
78. Mandal, supra note 22, at 262.
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result in convictions. 79 Contrary evidence is provided by the National
Family Heath Survey, which revealed that two out of every five women
in India are victims of physical, sexual or emotional domestic
violence. 80 The discrepancies between survey results and conviction
rates indicate that the number of convictions do not always portray the
reality of the situation.
Furthermore, low conviction rates often stem from poorly led
investigations, improperly collected evidence, and omissions of
witness statements. 81 What proponents of the misuse argument fail to
acknowledge is that limited resources, accessibility to the legal system
and debilitating stigma all pose barriers to women actually achieving
justice under these laws. The legal process for women to bring a case
against her husband is long, arduous, and embarrassing with remedies
being difficult and rare to obtain. 82 Registering a case with the police
often leads to intrusive and insensitive questions, while judicial
decisions indicate a hostility towards women bringing claims against
their husbands. 83 Oftentimes, after filing a case, women are advised to
withdraw their complaints. 84
Additionally, the argument that illiteracy, poverty and lack of
education in India make the concept of marital rape unworkable in the
country directly contradicts the argument that criminalization of
marital rape would lead to misuse. 85 If women are not educated or
resourced enough to allow proper implementation of such a law, it
follows that they would be just as ill-equipped to misuse the law. Other
hurdles include many women’s low economic standing as well as rural
79. Gabreil Domínguez, Misuse of anti-dowry law ‘exposes failure of Indian authorities’,
DEUTSCHE WELLE (July 7, 2014), http://www.dw.com/en/misuse-of-anti-dowry-law-exposesfailure-of-indian-authorities/a-17762685 [https://perma.cc/EX3S-ERGJ]; Rajesh Sharma &
Ors. v. State of UP and Anr, 1265 SCC.
80. Women to the Supreme Court: “We Are Not Liars,” Protest Against Dilution of §
498A, INVISIBLE LAWYER (July 31, 2017), http://www.lawyerscollective.org/the-invisiblelawyer/women-supreme-court-not-liars [https://perma.cc/57B2-T5CF]; MINISTRY OF HEALTH
AND FAMILY WELFARE - GOVERNMENT OF INDIA, GENDER EQUALITY AND WOMEN’S
EMPOWERMENT IN INDIA 95-96 (2009), available at http://rchiips.org/nfhs/a_subject_report_
gender_for_website.pdf [https://perma.cc/3T7F-T7LC]; NIGAM, supra note 22, at 10.
81. Women to the Supreme Court, supra note 80.
82. Mandal, supra note 22, at 262; Women to the Supreme Court, supra note 80.
83. Mandal, supra note 22, at 262; Women to the Supreme Court, supra note 80; see also
Agnes, supra note 71. See also Sachdev, supra note 1 (explaining how the Supreme Court of
India rejected two separate pleas asking for an amendment to the marital rape claim based on
the reasoning that since the petition was by an individual, the Court would not intervene).
84. Mandal, supra note 22, at 262.
85. NIGAM, supra note 22, at 4.
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women’s lack of access to courts and transportation. 86 Considering the
various obstacles women face in bringing claims against their
husbands, manipulating the system in their favor is a privilege that is
seldom bestowed to women in India. 87
B.

Arguments for Criminalization of Marital Rape

There are various arguments put forth by courts as well as nongovernmental organizations that support the criminalization of marital
rape in India. The marital rape exception can be seen as being contrary
to many of India’s national laws. The exception is also argued to be a
violation of various constitutional guarantees. Furthermore, the marital
rape exception violates a number of India’s international law
obligations. Aside from legal arguments under national laws, the
Constitution, and international law, arguments are also made about the
repercussions of marital rape on a woman physically and
psychologically. Lastly, the underlying justifications offered for the
exception to marital rape reflect old and outdated notions that have
been rejected by various courts around the globe.
1. In Contravention of Other National Laws
Allowing an exception to marital rape to persist is irrational when
looking at the bigger picture of national laws in India. Husbands can be
held accountable for other, lesser crimes against their wives with the
exception of rape. 88 Under the national laws of India, a husband can be
held accountable for voluntarily causing hurt, 89 voluntarily causing
hurt by dangerous weapons or means, 90 voluntarily causing grievous
86. Mandal, supra note 22, at 262.
87. Mandal, supra note 22, at 262.
88. See PEN. CODE §§ 323-325, 354, 354A, 354B, 354C, 354D (India).
89. See PEN. CODE § 323 (India). (“Punishment for voluntarily causing hurt: Whoever,
except in the case provided for by § 334, voluntarily causes hurt, shall be punished with
imprisonment of either description for a term which may extend to one year, or with fine which
may extend to one thousand rupees, or with both.”)
90. See PEN. CODE § 324 (India).
Voluntarily causing hurt by dangerous weapons or means: Whoever, except in the
case provided for by § 334, voluntarily causes hurt by means of any instrument for
shooting, stabbing or cutting, or any instrument which, used as a weapon of offence,
is likely to cause death, or by means of fire or any heated substance, or by means of
any poison or any corrosive substance, or by means of any explosive substance or by
means of any substance which it is deleterious to the human body to inhale, to
swallow, or to receive into the blood, or by means of any animal, shall be punished
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hurt, 91 assault with the intention of outraging her modesty, 92 sexual
harassment, 93 assault with the intent to disrobe, 94 voyeurism, 95 and
stalking. 96 If all of these acts can be criminal even in a marital
with imprisonment of either description for a term which may extend to three years,
or with fine, or with both.
Id.
91. See PEN. CODE § 325 (India) (“Punishment for voluntarily causing grievous hurt:
Whoever, except in the case provided for by § 335, voluntarily causes grievous hurt, shall be
punished with imprisonment of either description for a term which may extend to seven years,
and shall also be liable to fine.”).
92. See PEN. CODE § 354 (India) (“Whoever assaults or uses criminal force to any woman,
intending to outrage or knowing it to be likely that he will there by outrage her modesty.”).
93. See PEN. CODE § 354A (India).
Sexual harassment and punishment for sexual harassment: (1) A man committing any
of the following acts—
(i) physical contact and advances involving unwelcome and explicit sexual
overtures; or (ii) a demand or request for sexual favours; or
(iii) showing pornography against the will of a woman; or
(iv) making sexually coloured remarks
shall be guilty of the offence of sexual harassment.
Id.
94. See PEN. CODE § 354B (India).
Assault or use of criminal force to woman with intent to disrobe: Any man who
assaults or uses criminal force to any woman or abets such act with the intention of
disrobing or compelling her to be naked, shall be punished with imprisonment of
either description for a term which shall not be less than three years but which may
extend to seven years, and shall also be liable to fine.
Id.
95. See PEN. CODE § 354C (India).
Voyeurism: Any man who watches, or captures the image of a woman engaging in a
private act in circumstances where she would usually have the expectation of not
being observed either by the perpetrator or by any other person at the behest of the
perpetrator or disseminates such image shall be punished on first conviction with
imprisonment of either description for a term which shall not be less than one year,
but which may extend to three years, and shall also be liable to fine, and be punished
on a second or subsequent conviction, with imprisonment of either description for a
term which shall not be less than three years, but which may extend to seven years,
and shall also be liable to fine.
Id.
96. See PEN. CODE § 354D (India).
Stalking: (1) Any man who
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relationship, it is contradictory to purport that criminalizing marital
rape is not feasible in India. It is also discriminatory and contradictory
to only provide an exception for rape, while still criminalizing various
other offenses. Furthermore, maintaining the spousal exception is in
contravention to the Protection of Human Rights Act of 1993. The Act
defines human rights to include right to life, liberty, equality, and
dignity. 97 The Court in Independent Thought stipulated that forced
sexual intercourse with a girl child by her husband violates her rights
protected under the Protection of Human Rights Act. 98 The Protection
of Human Rights Act does not limit its protection to children. As such,
it reasonably follows that any forced intercourse would violate an
individual’s rights under the Protection of Human Rights Act. A similar
argument can be made regarding the Protection of Women from
Domestic Violence Act, 2005. 99 Allowing the marital rape exception
to stand even when it is shown to harm and injure women physically
and emotionally directly violates the rights protected under the
Domestic Violence Act.

(i) follows a woman and contacts, or attempts to contact such woman to foster
personal interaction repeatedly despite a clear indication of disinterest by such
woman; or
(ii) monitors the use by a woman of the internet, email or any other form of
electronic
communication,
commits the offence of stalking:
Provided that such conduct shall not amount to stalking if the man who pursued
it proves that—
(i) it was pursued for the purpose of preventing or detecting crime and the man
accused of stalking had been entrusted with the responsibility of prevention and
detection of crime by the State; or
(ii) it was pursued under any law or to comply with any condition or requirement
imposed by any person under any law; or
(iii)
in the particular circumstances such conduct was reasonable and
justified.
Id.
97. The Protection of Human Rights Act, No. 10 of 1993, PEN. CODE § 2(d); Independent
Thought, 382 SCC at 22.
98. Independent Thought, 382 SCC at 22.
99. See Independent Thought, 382 SCC at 22.
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2. Violation of Constitutional Guarantees
Preserving Exception 2 to Section 375 of the Indian Penal Code
violates rights and protections guaranteed by the Indian Constitution,
specifically Article 14, 15(3), and 21. Article 14 of the Constitution of
India is an equal protection clause that guarantees equality before the
law and prohibits discrimination on the grounds of religion, race, caste,
sex or place of birth. 100 Article 15(3) allows the State to make special
provisions for women and children. 101 Article 21 of the Constitution
establishes protection of life and personal liberty. 102
Article 14 provides two facets—equality before law and equal
protection of law. 103 Equality before the law includes aspects such as
the denial of any privileged class or person as well as the State’s
obligation to bring about a more equal society as envisioned by the
preamble and part IV of the Constitution through jurisprudence. 104 In
interpreting Article 14, the Supreme Court of India has stated that “all
persons similarly circumstanced shall be treated alike in privileges
conferred and liabilities imposed.” 105 Furthermore, the test under
Article 14 is one of reasonable classification made with the object of
achieving a certain end. 106 As such, legislation that is based on an
unreasonable and discriminatory classification should be struck down
under Article 14 of the Constitution. 107 The marital rape exception,
which is now applicable to married women eighteen years of age and
older can be seen as arbitrary and discriminatory as it provides for an
unsupported distinction between married and unmarried women even
though both may be subject to the exact same maltreatment.
100. INDIA CONST., art. 14. See generally Sri Srinivasa Theatre v. Govt. of Tamil Nadu,
(1992) SCR 164 (India).
101. INDIA CONST., art. 15(3); Independent Thought, 382 SCC at 4, 33, 114 (Supreme
Court argues that the distinction between married and unmarried girl children violates the ethos
of Article 15(3)). Similarly, the distinction between married and unmarried adult women would
violate the spirit of Article 15(3).
102. INDIA CONST., art. 21; Independent Thought, 382 SCC at 113; Riya Jain, Article 21
of the Constitution of India – Right to Life and Personal Liberty, ACADEMIKE (Nov. 13, 2015),
https://www.lawctopus.com/academike/article-21-of-the-constitution-of-india-right-to-lifeand-personal-liberty/ [https://perma.cc/8QQ5-C39S].
103. See Jain, supra note 102. See generally Sri Srinivasa Theatre v. Govt. of Tamil Nadu,
SCR 164.
104. Jain, supra note 102. See generally Sri Srinivasa, SCR 164.
105. Re: Special Courts Bill v. Unknown, (1978) 380 SCC (India); see Jain, supra note
102.
106. Independent Thought, 382 SCC at 109-10. See generally Sri Srinivasa Theatre, SCR
164; Re: Special Courts Bill, 380 SCC.
107. Independent Thought, 382 SCC at 109-10.
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Article 21 of the Constitution bestows the right to life and the right
to personal liberty. 108 Under Munn v. Illinois, the US Supreme Court
recognized that the right to life is more than a mere animal existence.109
This interpretation was later affirmed by the Supreme Court of India
under Bandhua Mukti Morcha v. Union of India. 110 The Court affirmed
that the right to life protected under Article 21 preserves the right to
life with human dignity. 111 The Supreme Court of India has
additionally affirmed that rape infringes on the right to live life with
dignity. 112 As such, allowing for an exception to marital rape infringes
on the right to life protected under Article 21 of the Constitution. 113
Furthermore, the Supreme Court has recognized that although the
right to privacy is not specifically mentioned in the Indian Constitution,
the right is protected under Article 21 of the Constitution under the
umbrella of personal liberty. 114 Again, the Court has acknowledged that
sexual violence is an intrusion into the right to privacy of a female.115
Under State of Maharashtra v. Madhkar Narayan, the Supreme Court
held that every woman is entitled to sexual privacy. 116 Hence,
legalizing rape in the context of marriage violates a woman’s right to
privacy guaranteed under Article 21 of the Constitution.
Additionally, the Supreme Court of India has interpreted Article
21 to encompass the right to good health under the right to life. 117 Rape,
in any context, is known to cause a plethora of physical and
psychological damage. Sexual violence is known to cause depression,
anxiety, pregnancy complications, sexual transmitted diseases as well

108. INDIA CONST., art. 21. Maneka Gandhi v. Union of India, (1978) SCR 621 (India).
109. Munn v. Illinois, 94 U.S. 113 (1877).
110. Bandhua Mukti Morcha v. Union of India, (1984) SCR (India); Dr. Bhavish Gupta &
Dr. Meenu Gupta, Marital Rape: - Current Legal Framework in India and the Need for Change,
1 GALGOTIAS J. OF LEGAL STUD. 16, 26 (2013).
111. Gupta & Gupta, supra note 110; The Chairman, Railway Board v. Chandrima Das,
(2000) SCC 988 (India).
112. Independent Thought, 382 SCC at 22; The Chairman, Railway Board, (2000) SCC;
Gupta & Gupta, supra note 110, at 27.
113. INDIA CONST., art. 21.
114. Kharak Singh v. State of U.P., AIR 1963 SC 1295 (India); Govind v. State of Madhya
Pradesh, AIR 1975 SC 1378 (India); Gupta & Gupta, supra note 110, at 27.
115. Independent Thought, 382 SCC at 22; Karnataka v Krishnappa (2000) SCC (India);
State of Maharashtra v. Madhukar Narayan Mardikar, AIR 1991 SC 207 (India).
116. Madhukar Narayan Mardikar, AIR 1991 SC 207; Gupta & Gupta, supra note 110, at
27.
117. CESC Ltd. v. Subhash Chandra, (1992) SCR (India); Gupta & Gupta, supra note 110,
at 28.
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as various other physical and mental repercussions. 118 The Court has
recognized on multiple occasions that rape inevitably causes serious
physical and psychological harm. 119 Under Independent Thought,
where the Court struck down the marital rape exception for child
brides, they also conceded that the traumatic consequences of rape
affect adult victims as well. 120 Consequentially, in light of the Court’s
recognition of the right to good health as a fundamental right protected
under the right to life in Article 21 of the Constitution and the Court’s
assertion that rape inevitably causes physical and psychological
consequences, it reasonably follows that the exception to marital rape
in Section 375 of the Indian Penal Code violates the Constitution of
India.
3. In Contravention of International Law Obligations
India has ratified the Convention on the Elimination of All Forms
of Discrimination Against Women, the International Covenant on Civil
and Political Rights (“ICCPR”), and the International Covenant on
Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (“ICESCR”). 121 India is also a
signatory of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights (“UDHR”).122
The CEDAW Committee has identified that gender-based violence
nullifies various other rights guaranteed under international treaties,
including the right to be free from discrimination, the right to life, right
to liberty and security, right to equality in the family, and right to health
and well-being. 123

118. Melanie Randall & Vasanthi Venkatesh, The Right to No: The Crime of Marital Rape,
Women’s Human Rights, and International Law, 41 BROOK. J. INT’L L. 153, 194 (2015);
WORLD HEALTH ORG., UNDERSTANDING AND ADDRESSING VIOLENCE AGAINST WOMEN 7
(2012).
119. Independent Thought, 382 SCC at 42. See generally State of Punjab v. Gurmit Singh,
(1996) 2 SCC 384.
120. Independent Thought, 382 SCC at 43.
121. Independent Thought, 382 SCC at 25-26; Core International Human Rights Treaties,
Optional Protocols & Core ILO Conventions Ratified by India, in NAT’L HUMAN RIGHTS
COMMISSION, INDIA, A HANDBOOK ON INTERNATIONAL HUMAN RIGHTS CONVENTION 22-25
(2012),
available
at
http://nhrc.nic.in/sites/default/files/A_Handbook_on_International_HR_Conventions.pdf
[https://perma.cc/A4VW-ZXQU] [hereinafter A HANDBOOK ON INTERNATIONAL HUMAN
RIGHTS].
122. A HANDBOOK ON INTERNATIONAL HUMAN RIGHTS CONVENTION, supra note 121.
123. Through General Recommendation No. 19 (llth session, 1992), art. 7, the CEDAW
Committee stated:
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The due diligence requirement under international law treaties,
specifically under CEDAW, requires states to “take all appropriate
measures” to eliminate all forms of discrimination against women.124
Furthermore, Article 2(b) of CEDAW mandates states to adopt all
legislation necessary to eliminate all forms of discrimination against
women. 125 Discrimination against women has been defined to include
gender-based violence including acts that inflict physical, mental, or
sexual harm. 126 Moreover, the obligation under Article 2 of CEDAW
specifies that the state is required to take all appropriate measures to
eliminate discrimination against women not only on behalf of the
Government, but also to eliminate discrimination perpetrated by any
person or organization. 127 Under the international obligation regarding
prevention of violence against women, states are required to prevent,
investigate, prosecute, and compensate with due diligence. 128 As such,
it has been established that the due diligence requirement under
CEDAW requires the criminalization of marital rape under national
law. 129
Furthermore, allowing an exception for marital rape infringes on
a woman’s right to be free from discrimination under international
Gender-based violence, which impairs or nullifies the enjoyment by women of human
rights and fundamental freedoms under general international law or under human
rights conventions, is discrimination within the meaning of article 1 of the
Convention. These rights and freedoms include: (a) The right to life; (b) The right not
to be subject to torture or to cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment; (c)
The right to equal protection according to humanitarian norms in time of international
or internal armed conflict; (d) The right to liberty and security of person; (e) The right
to equal protection under the law; (f) The right to equality in the family; (g) The right
to the highest standard attainable of physical and mental health; (h) The right to just
and favourable conditions of work.
See also, Randall & Venkatesh, supra note 118, at 166.
124. Report of the Special Rapporteur on violence against women, its causes and
consequences, Rashida Manjoo, A/HRC/29/27, art. 22. Convention on the Elimination of All
Forms of Discrimination Against Women, Dec. 18, 1979, 1249 U.N.T.S. 13, art. 2 [hereinafter
CEDAW].
125. CEDAW, supra note 124, art. 2(b). Report of the Special Rapporteur on violence
against women, supra note 124, art. 22.
126. CEDAW, supra note 124, art. 1. CEDAW General Recommendation No. 19 (llth
session, 1992), art. 6.
127. CEDAW, supra note 124, art. 2(e). CEDAW General Recommendation No. 19 (llth
session, 1992), art. 9.
128. Randall & Venkatesh, supra note 118, at 166; CEDAW General Recommendation
No. 19 (11th session, 1992); Declaration on the Elimination of Violence Against Women, art.
4(c), U.N. Doc. A/RES/48/104 (Dec. 20, 1993).
129. Randall & Venkatesh, supra note 118, at 165-66; See also CEDAW General
Recommendation No. 19 (llth session, 1992), art. 24(b).
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law. 130 As stated above, freedom from discrimination is protected
under CEDAW. 131 It is also implicitly protected under the ICECSR
since it is recognized that intimate partner violence weakens the ability
of an individual to meaningfully benefit from economic, social and
cultural rights. 132
Marital rape is an infringement on the right to life. 133 The right to
life is an essential right guaranteed by all human rights treaties and
customary international law. 134 Specific guarantees to the right to life
can be found in the ICCPT 135 and the UDHR. 136 Violence against
women in the context of intimate partner violence has been recognized
as a leading cause of death around the globe. 137 Marital rape also
equates to other consequences that infringe on the right to life including
increases in miscarriages, complications during pregnancies, unsafe
abortion practices, and the higher likelihood of contracting sexual
transmitted diseases, all of which can lead to fatal results. 138 As a result,
criminalization of marital rape is a fundamental obligation states must
undertake in order to meet their international law obligations.
Marital rape also violates the right to liberty and security of
person. 139 The right to liberty is again guaranteed by the ICCPR140 and
UDHR. 141 Article 9 of the ICCPR requires State parties to respond
appropriately to patterns of violence against women. 142 Violence
against women in the form of marital rape can potentially continue
relentlessly throughout the relationship. As such, under international
130. CEDAW General Recommendation No. 19 (llth session, 1992), art. 7; Randall &
Venkatesh, supra note 118, at 189.
131. CEDAW, supra note 124, art. 1; Randall & Venkatesh, supra note 118, at 189.
132. Randall & Venkatesh, supra note 118, at 190.
133. CEDAW General Recommendation No. 19 (llth session, 1992), art. 7. Randall &
Venkatesh, supra note 118, at 184.
134. Randall & Venkatesh, supra note 118, at 184.
135. International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, Dec. 16, 1966, S. Treaty Doc.
No. 95-20, 6 I.L.M. 368 (1967), 999 U.N.T.S. 171, art. 6 [hereinafter ICCPR]. Randall &
Venkatesh, supra note 118, at 184.
136. Universal Declaration of Human Rights, G.A. Res. 217a (III), U.N. Doc. A/810 at 71
(1948), art. 3 [hereinafter UDHR]. Randall & Venkatesh, supra note 118, at 184.
137. Randall & Venkatesh, supra note 118, at 184; U.N. SECRETARY-GENERAL, ENDING
VIOLENCE AGAINST WOMEN 43-45 (2006).
138. Randall & Venkatesh, supra note 118, at 184; WORLD HEALTH ORG.,
UNDERSTANDING AND ADDRESSING VIOLENCE AGAINST WOMEN, supra note 118, at 7.
139. CEDAW General Recommendation No. 19 (llth session, 1992), art. 7; Randall &
Venkatesh, supra note 118, at 186.
140. ICCPR, supra note 135, art. 9. Randall & Venkatesh, supra note 118, at 186.
141. UDHR, supra note 136, arts. 3, 9. Randall & Venkatesh, supra note 118, at 186.
142. Randall & Venkatesh, supra note 118, at 187. ICCPR, supra note 135, art. 9.
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law, States are required to recognize marital rape as a pattern of
violence against women and take appropriate measures to criminalize
and penalize such behavior.
Additionally, gender-based violence infringes on the right to
equality in the family guaranteed under international obligations.143
Under the CEDAW, States are required to change social and cultural
patterns in order to eliminate prejudices that perpetuate stereotypes
between men and women. 144 Maintaining an exception for marital rape
perpetuates stereotypes that a woman is the sexual property of her
husband negating any semblance of equality within the family. 145
Criminalizing marital rape refutes the idea that women are the sexual
property of their husbands and indicates that marriage should be built
on equal grounds between both spouses. 146 As such, eradicating the
exception to marital rape is necessary to uphold India’s obligation to
promote equality within the family.
Lastly, criminalizing marital rape is tantamount in upholding
India’s international obligation to protect the right to health and wellbeing. Protection of health and well-being is mandated by the UDHR147
and ICESCR. 148 The Committee on Economic, Social, and Cultural
Rights goes further to specify that under Article 12 of ICESCR, States
are required to diminish women’s health risks by protecting them from
domestic violence. 149 Intimate partner sexual violence can cause a
number of health consequences physically and psychologically. 150
Physical consequences can include miscarriages, bladder infections,
infertility, and potential contraction of sexual transmitted diseases.151
Psychological consequences can comprise of depression, anxiety,
143. CEDAW General Recommendation No. 19 (llth session, 1992), art. 7. Randall &
Venkatesh, supra note 118, at 192.
144. CEDAW, supra note 124, art. 5(a). Randall & Venkatesh, supra note 118, at 193.
145. Randall & Venkatesh, supra note 118, at 192.
146. Randall & Venkatesh, supra note 118, at 193.
147. UDHR, supra note 136, art. 25(1). Randall & Venkatesh, supra note 118, at 194.
148. International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, Dec. 16, 1966, S.
Treaty Doc. No. 95-10, 6 I.L.M. 360 (1967), 993 U.N.T.S. 3, art. 12 [hereinafter ICESCR].
Randall & Venkatesh, supra note 118, at 192.
149. Randall & Venkatesh, supra note 118, at 194.
150. Randall & Venkatesh, supra note 118, at 194; WORLD HEALTH ORG.,
UNDERSTANDING AND ADDRESSING VIOLENCE AGAINST WOMEN, supra note 118, at 7.
151. U.N. Econ. & Soc. Council, Substantive Issues Arising in the Implementation of the
International Covenant on Economic, Social, and Cultural Rights, General Comment No. 14
(2000), ¶ 21, E/C/.12/2000/4 (Aug. 11, 2000); Randall & Venkatesh, supra note 118, at 195;
WORLD HEALTH ORG., UNDERSTANDING AND ADDRESSING VIOLENCE AGAINST WOMEN,
supra note 118, at 7.
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shock, post-traumatic stress disorder, and suicidal thoughts.152
Maintaining an exception to marital rape clearly infringes on a state’s
obligation to protect the health and well-being of women.
IV. CONTINUING EFFORTS TO COMBAT MARITAL RAPE
It is evident that marital rape is a prevalent issue facing India and
there are several actions that need to be taken in order to properly
combat its pervasiveness. At the very least, the marital rape exception
needs to be eliminated making rape within a marriage a criminal
offense and effectively removing marriage as a defense to rape.
Criminalizing marital rape is only the first step that needs to be taken.
In order to completely eradicate marital rape, there are still various
economic, social, and legal barriers that need to be addressed in order
to provide women who face sexual violence in marriage with an
effective remedy. Gender-sensitivity training needs to be provided to
various vocations including the police and the judiciary. Furthermore,
centers and sanctuaries should be provided by the State in order to aid
women in removing themselves from violent environments and
providing them with necessary support services. Lastly, the State needs
to adopt a national policy towards eradicating pervasive stereotypes
and stigma against women generally and married women specifically.
A.

Repeal the Marital Rape Exception

First off, it is imperative that the marital rape exception be entirely
eradicated from the Indian Penal Code. 153 Similarly, the Code should
affirmatively define marital rape as a criminal offense, which would
also effectively prevent marriage from being used as a defense to rape
claims. 154 Laws are enacted in order to punish unsocial behaviors,
provide deterrent against socially unacceptable actions, and generally
educate society regarding the overarching consensus on moral and

152. Randall & Venkatesh, supra note 118, at 194; WORLD HEALTH ORG.,
UNDERSTANDING AND ADDRESSING VIOLENCE AGAINST WOMEN, supra note 118, at 7.
153. Concluding Observations, supra note 72, at 3; NIGAM, supra note 22, at 18.
154. Concluding Observations, supra note 72, at 3; Pranesh Prasad, A Strategy For
Criminalizing Marital Rape in India, HUFFINGTON POST (Sept. 25, 2016),
https://www.huffingtonpost.in/pranesh-prasad/a-strategy-for-criminalizing-marital-rape-inindia_a_21478727/ [https://perma.cc/DUS4-BX7A].
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social conduct. 155 By not criminalizing such conduct and providing
marriage as an affirmative defense to rape allegations, the State
effectively relates to society that forced conjugal relations, even violent
encounters, are socially acceptable behaviors. 156 It also perpetuates
stereotypes and biases against married women including the idea that
consent is implied by marriage and that women lose their bodily
autonomy when entering into the marital relationship. 157
B.

Establish Efficient Police Practices

Secondly, the State needs to bolster efficient police practices.158
Antagonistic police practices are a large hurdle that discourage women
from reporting violence in the first place. Furthermore, law
enforcement discretion allows police officers to refuse to file cases,
posing another barrier for women reporting sexual violence in marital
relationships. 159 Specifically, the State needs to establish Standard
Procedures for the police regarding cases of violence against girls and
women. 160 Gender-sensitive training needs to be mandated and
provided to ensure proper treatment of victims and witnesses as well as
efficient investigations and case-filings. 161
C. Remedy Hostile Judicial Practices
Furthermore, the hostility portrayed by the judiciary in previous
marital violence cases where the bench has consistently underplayed
the seriousness of marital rape also needs to be challenged. 162 Such
practices can be efficiently combatted by providing sentencing
guidelines to courts regarding marital sexual violence cases. It is also
imperative to provide gender-sensitive training to judicial officials. 163
155. NIGAM, supra note 22, at 7; Melanie Randall & Vasanthi Venkatesh, Symposium on
the International Legal Obligation to Criminalize Marital Rape Criminalizing Sexual Violence
Against Women in Intimate Relationships: State Obligations Under Human Rights Law, 109
AMER. J. INT’L L. 189, 195 (2015).
156. NIGAM, supra note 22, at 7. Prasad, supra note 154.
157. NIGAM, supra note 22, at 7.
158. Concluding Observations, supra note 72, at 3.
159. Randall & Venkatesh, supra note 155, at 195.
160. Concluding Observations, supra note 72, at 3.
161. Concluding Observations, supra note 72, at 3-4; Ram Kishor Deora & Mukul Krishna
Vyas, Marital Rape – A Blot on Socio-Legal Machinery, 2 HUM. RTS. INT’L RES. J. 27, 31-32
(2014). Randall & Venkatesh, supra note 155, at 195-96.
162. Mandal, supra note 22, at 257.
163. Concluding Observations, supra note 72, at 4.
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D. Establish Accessible Crisis Centers
Moreover, an important aspect of ensuring that marital violence
against women is appropriately prevented, the State needs to ensure
that women have access to important support mechanisms. Many
women, particularly in rural areas of India will not report sexual
violence to authorities because of their financial dependency on their
husbands. 164 They fear that if they are separated from their husbands,
they will be left with no alternative support system. As such, the State
should establish widespread and accessible crisis centers where female
victims of violence and rape can receive shelter, medical and
psychological attention, legal assistance, and other needed support
services. 165
E.

Combat Damaging Stereotypes

Lastly, persistence of marital rape in India can be attributed to the
ingrained patriarchal mindsets as well as debilitating social and
economic structures prevalent throughout the country. Women are less
likely to report instances of rape within their marriage because of the
social stigma attached to rape victims in India as well as the disrepute
that attacks women who fail in “making their marriage work.” 166 As
such, an essential factor in combatting marital rape is the fight against
deep-rooted stigma and stereotypes concerning women.167
Specifically, it is imperative to educate the masses that marriage does
not indicate that a woman’s legal and sexual autonomy have ceased to
exist. 168 Elimination of these and other stereotypes can be served by
widespread education and dissemination of information regarding
women’s equality in social, political and economic institutions as well
as women’s bodily autonomy before and after marriage. The State
needs to prioritize a national movement to fight and eliminate
patriarchal stereotypes by targeted awareness-raising campaigns. 169
Along with educating girls on their rights, it is imperative to involve
164. Sutirtha Sahariah, Indian Courts Finally Consider Making Marital Rape Illegal,
GLOBAL CITIZEN (Dec. 1, 2017), https://www.globalcitizen.org/en/content/marital-rape-indiacriminal-offense/ [https://perma.cc/T7XR-BQDQ].
165. Concluding Observations, supra note 72, at 3; Randall & Venkatesh, supra note 155,
at 196.
166. Singh, supra note 56, at 24.
167. NIGAM, supra note 22, at 18.
168. Deora & Vyas, supra note 161, at 32.
169. Concluding Observations, supra note 72, at 7.
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and educate men and boys in the effort to combat marital rape as well
as the overarching goal of attaining gender equality in India. 170

170. U.N. Population Fund, A Year of Renewal 28 (2014).

